Who controls the Indian Ocean?

Map of Maritime Geo-politics

The countries around Indian Ocean were fully connected in term of trade activities and merchant logistic movements. Indian Ocean remains vital area for those countries to support their own economic interest. Within Indian Ocean located The Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Hormuz Strait, and Malacca Strait in which 70% of total traffic of petrouleum products through the Middle east to Pacific. Indian Ocean is one of the main route for world trade passes. Some experts believed that Indian Ocean will matter even more in the future .

India, the fourth largest energy consumer, dependent on its 90% oil import from Persian Gulf through Indian Ocean. India’s trade with the Arab countries is increasing year after year, and now both are enjoying economic and cultural ties . In 2005, India and Iran signed a great deal in which Iran will supply Indian 7.5 million tons of LNG (liquefied natural gas) annually for 25 years . Those are India’s small part of benefit because its strategic position in Indian Ocean. In decades, India economic growth are highly increasing, together with the growing awareness of the Indian Ocean potentials through the increasing of military expenditures. India started to transform and buildup its defense and greater naval expansion by huge modernization programme for adding high-tech military technology. Now India has more than 155 warships, three nuclear-powered submarines and three aircraft carriers . Since then, India focused on buildup its long-range aircraft, aircraft carriers, and nuclear submarines, in which intended to maximize India’s effort on preserved the Indian Ocean.

China, as the fourth largest defence expenditure in the world, also dominantly using Indian Ocean for transporting oil and other energy, some using pipelines from ports on the Indian Ocean into the heart of China . China is now has rapidly rising trend in military expenditure, especially on navy. China’s navy way more superior than Indian navy in both qualitative an quatitative measures. China’s increasing its modern submarine, ballistic missiles, and GPS-blocking technology. China claimed they will ready to build its own aircraft carriers by the end of this decade.

India’s economic growth is heavily dependent on the free flow of goods through the Indian Ocean, around 90% of India’s trade is reliant on merchant shipping. Indian strategic thinkers always emphasized the nedd for India to play a great role in Indian Ocean. According to K.M Pannikar, Indian Ocean is remain for “truly Indian” because for Indians, Indian Ocean is a very vital sea and its lifelines are concentrated in that area. Now, India has been invest greater resources in naval expansion because of the growing of Chinese influence in the region. It has a greater possibilities to disrupt Indian interest and economic activities in Indian Ocean in the future. The Chinese expansion is increasing during the realization that Indian Ocean will give strategic military leverage that China needs as the regional hegemon in Asia. China projecting their power into Indian Ocean through China’s “string of pearls” strategy. It means that China will improving and build naval facilities along the ocean, such as naval base in Pakistan, fueling station in Sri Lanka, container facility in Bangladesh, naval base and pipelines in Myanmar, and canal in Thailand. Those activities are thretened India, and India fears that it will strategically encircled by China and instead of enjoying geographical advantages, India  is troubled by China as it’s restricts India’s freedom to freely manouvre in the region, unless India started to make a move to expand its influence. Realizing that India can’t make a greater move beyond China, India create a diplomatic initiatives with US. The US-India naval military now could balancing the China’s influence in the Indian Ocean. India improving its naval presence from Mozambique Channel to South China Sea. China’sport in Gwadar, Pakistan has been used as “listening post” to monitoring US-Indian activity in the Indian Ocean . Thus, create a classic security dilemma in 21st century in the form of maritime great game between India and China in Indian Ocean to win the power of Indian Ocean.

Indian strategic thinkers has emphasized The Indian Ocean as India’s backyard, in which the country needs to play a greater role towards the Indian Ocean to preserve national security and stability. According to Mahan, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. The ocean is the key to seven seas. In the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters” it gives a greater influence on Indian security strategist and to India’s foreign policy. They thought India as the legatee of the British rule in 21st century in providing peace and stability in the ocean. While it’s also concerned about India’s hegemonistic in the region. The presence of China in the Indian Ocean is deeply concerned. China seems to map out clear strategies of the future importance of ocean areas, which enables the nation to buildup its strategic leadership to develop and further expand their maritime economy. The China’s “string of pearls” strategy is picturing Mahan thought that “in peace, naval strategy may gain its most decisive victories by occupying in a country to get excellent positions which hardly be got by war”. India can be considered geographically strategic, located near the Indian Ocean and is between the Middle East and Asia, enabling many access to trade and economic activities to pass through.

The US manouvre in the middle of India and China balance of power in Indian Ocean is inevitable, regarding the Indian Ocean’s seaway is very important for energy and trade movements. The US perceived there are geographical challenges in Asia between those two giants growing presence. China, is not US’ enemeny, but a legitimate competitor. Now, focusing in Indian Ocean, Chinese navy have more warships than US and China is producing and acquiring submarines five times faster than the US . China also focused on buildup aircrafts, buying ballistic missiles that can hit moving targets at the sea and technology that blocks signals from GPS satellites, in which the US rely the most. While US military planners are considering to build a naval base in Sri Lanka, China already constructing a refueling station for their warships there . But the US’ “cooperative maritime” strategy already build allies with India and Japan to balancing against China in Indian Ocean. Rather than going it alone, the US strategist planners thought it should be a coalition to patrol together and information sharing . China do not acknowledge that US maritime power enables the smaller countries to projecting challenge against China.

The US manouver in the center of India and China balance of power in Indian Ocean is inevitable, regarding the Indian Ocean’s seaway is very important for energy and trade movements. The US perceived there are geographical challenges in Asia between those two giants growing presence. China, is not United States enemy, but a legitimate competitor. Now, focusing on Indian Ocean, the Chinese navy have more warships than US. They are producing and acquiring submarines five times faster than the US. Compared to other countries in Asia, the largest number of submarine and other kinds of military fleets points to China. This is the reason why the largest government budget allocated is to the defence sector so they could focus rebuilding their military capabilities. China also focused on buildup aircrafts, buying ballistic missiles that could hit moving targets at the sea and technology that blocks signals from GPS satellites, in which the US rely the most . While US military planners are considering to build a naval base in Sri Lanka, China already constructing a refueling station for their warships there. But the US’ “cooperative maritime” strategy already build allies with India and Japan to balancing against China in Indian Ocean. Rather than going it alone, the US strategist planners thought it should be a coalition to patrol together and information sharing. China do not acknowledge that US maritime power enables the smaller countries to projecting challenge against China.  

The Mahan influence on US is drive to nation to the conditions where it’s navy could bring national greatness to control of the seas. Mahan viewed that US have capabilities for creating it’s wealth by overseas trade. The trade ties that connects US with other countries has big economic benefits. This leads United States closer to commercial competition in which they should pursue. According to Mahan, during peace time, seapower must be projected as preventive force that may gain friends of support, because by protecting waters with a friendly one, it will encourage allies to develop the commercial markets within the sea. The sea certainly gives a huge potential to economic activities therefore it make sense the Mahan believes the sea can be a major bridge to trade. Establishing ties on maritime and sea will certainly reduce the possibility of tensions such as disputes. Since the sea are huge areas where boundaries are invisible, conflicts could happen anytime.  The more usefull the sea is for commerce, the lesser the risk and possibility of armed conflict to happen within the region. The US maneuver in the Indian Ocean is exercising the navy force that establishes the ground of liberal trade on the sea and as prevention towards greater armed domination.

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